The Market for Corporate Control with Influential- and Dependent-Stakeholder Protection

Affiliation auteursAffiliation ok
TitreThe Market for Corporate Control with Influential- and Dependent-Stakeholder Protection
Type de publicationJournal Article
Year of Publication2017
AuteursAt C
JournalJOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT
Volume173
Pagination419-430
Date PublishedSEP
Type of ArticleArticle
ISSN0932-4569
Résumé

This paper investigates how the level of stakeholder protection affects the market for corporate control. Two types of stakeholder protection are distinguished: the influential stakeholders' claims apply to the part of the firm's revenues that is not diverted by the manager as private benefits; the dependent stakeholders obtain a fraction of the firm's revenues once the private benefits have been realized. Stakeholder protection is not irrelevant for the market for corporate control, and its effects on the price paid by the bidder, the success or failure of takeovers, and their frequency depend crucially on the types of stakeholder protection.

DOI10.1628/093245616X14660658344881