Taxing congestion of the space commons
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Titre | Taxing congestion of the space commons |
Type de publication | Journal Article |
Year of Publication | 2020 |
Auteurs | Beal S, Deschamps M, Moulin H |
Journal | ACTA ASTRONAUTICA |
Volume | 177 |
Pagination | 313-319 |
Date Published | DEC |
Type of Article | Article |
ISSN | 0094-5765 |
Mots-clés | Collision, game theory, Satellites, Space agents, Space debris, Tax system, Tragedy of the commons |
Résumé | Satellites launched by independent spacefaring agencies and firms create space congestion and collision risk. Taking as benchmark the cost of a marginal reduction of the congestion rate, we discuss tax mechanisms financing a debris removal effort. We compare the non-cooperative equilibrium traffic when there is a tax on each new launch to recover cleanup costs, with the welfare optimal traffic under a centralized tax. We find that under the latter it is twice as easy to recover cleanup costs and increase traffic than under the former. We also show that a linear tax is twice as effective as a quadratic one. |
DOI | 10.1016/j.actaastro.2020.07.036 |