Taxing congestion of the space commons

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TitreTaxing congestion of the space commons
Type de publicationJournal Article
Year of Publication2020
AuteursBeal S, Deschamps M, Moulin H
JournalACTA ASTRONAUTICA
Volume177
Pagination313-319
Date PublishedDEC
Type of ArticleArticle
ISSN0094-5765
Mots-clésCollision, game theory, Satellites, Space agents, Space debris, Tax system, Tragedy of the commons
Résumé

Satellites launched by independent spacefaring agencies and firms create space congestion and collision risk. Taking as benchmark the cost of a marginal reduction of the congestion rate, we discuss tax mechanisms financing a debris removal effort. We compare the non-cooperative equilibrium traffic when there is a tax on each new launch to recover cleanup costs, with the welfare optimal traffic under a centralized tax. We find that under the latter it is twice as easy to recover cleanup costs and increase traffic than under the former. We also show that a linear tax is twice as effective as a quadratic one.

DOI10.1016/j.actaastro.2020.07.036