``Facta non verba'': An experiment on pledging and giving

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Titre``Facta non verba'': An experiment on pledging and giving
Type de publicationJournal Article
Year of Publication2018
AuteursSutan A, Grolleau G, Mateu G, Vranceanu R
JournalJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
Volume65
Pagination1-15
Date PublishedAPR
Type of ArticleArticle
ISSN0167-4870
Mots-clésCharitable giving, Commitment, Dictator game, Experiments, Pledge
Résumé

We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals' endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in terms of increased endowment dispersion) for both private and public pledge situations, although donations with private pledges remain higher than donations with public pledge. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

DOI10.1016/j.joep.2018.01.006